The consolidation of centre-right parties in the Czech Republic as an issue for comparative analysis by Hanley, SL
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The consolidation of centre-right parties in the 
 Czech Republic as an issue for comparative analysis 
 
 
 
Submission to Politologický časopis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Seán Hanley 
Senior Lecturer in East European Politics 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
University College London 
s.hanley@ssees.ucl.ac.uk 
tel + 44 207 679 8818 
 2 
The consolidation of centre-right parties in the Czech Republic  
as an issue for comparative analysis
1
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The emergence of strong parties of the centre-right in the Czech Republic in the early 
1990s of a predominantly neo-liberal or ‘liberal conservative’ orientation was one of 
the more unexpected outcomes of early post-transition politics in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Many commentators had assumed that Czech(oslovak) party system would be 
shaped by what they took to be) the country’s ‘social democratic tradition’ or cultural 
proximity to the social market economies such as Austria or Germany. A centre-right 
bloc, if it emerged at all, was expected, to be Christian Democratic in character. 
 
Such expectations were rapidly confounded by the formation and rise of the Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS) in 1990-1 which, as academic observers more correctly 
anticipated, became one of the most electorally successful and enduring party 
formations in the region, contributing both to stable broader pattern of centre-right 
politics and the wider consolidation of the Czech party system. In this paper, rather  
giving a narrative overview of the development of Czech centre-right parties or 
considering its ‘unexpected’ character (for my own attempts to address this see 
Hanley 2007), I reflect upon the questions of Czech centre-right’s stabilization 
reviewing how existing literature has addressed this issue and considering what future 
directions might be open to researchers.  The paper considers principal three sets of 
issues: 
 The extent to which centre-right parties in the Czech Republic have undergone 
patterns and processes of consolidation distinct from general processes of 
party (system) consolidation in the country. 
 The extent to which centre-right parties in the Czech Republic have undergone 
patterns and processes of consolidation distinct from those in comparable 
cases in the Central and East European region and beyond. 
 The extent to which research on the Czech centre-right might make a broader 
theoretical and comparative contribution to the literature on parties.  
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In doing so, I am guided by the view that the single country studies, however 
theoretically informed and empirically rich they might be, must be explicitly 
integrated into a comparative perspective that goes beyond a mere juxtaposition of 
national cases. As Kitschelt (2006) argues when this not undertaken – or is undertaken 
inadequately - such approaches risk degenerating into mere ‘story-telling’ and will 
have limited (and decreasing) intellectual impact (Lees 2007; see also van Biezen and 
Carmani 2006). 
 
The distinctness of the Czech centre-right 
In comparative (cross-national) terms the Czech centre-right is distinct in a number of 
respects. The dominant centre-right grouping, the Civic Democratic Party, has a 
strong (neo-)liberal orientation, while the more conservative, social market-oriented 
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) are a minor party and sometime junior partner to 
ODS and the ‘civic’ right. This reverses a more common pattern in Central and 
Eastern Europe where (neo-)liberal parties have been small weak parties 
overshadowed by electorally and politically dominant conservative-national or 
national-populist blocs. KDU-ČSL is also distinct among Christian Democratic and 
Christian parties in the region in the relative moderation of its social conservatism, 
greater stress on socio-economic issues and greater openness to economic liberalism. 
Such features reflect – and shape – distinct aspect of the wider Czech party system: 
the centrality of distributional issues as the key dimensions of party competition and, 
to a more limited extent, party-voter linkages. Czech centre-right parties – like their 
left-wing counterparts - have also had little difficulty in profiling themselves (and 
winning acceptance) as bona fide members of West European party families and 
Euro-party groupings: the Civic Democrats’ projection of themselves as liberal-
conservative grouping in the Anglo-American tradition and close alignment with the 
British Conservatives has made it one of the least political problematic members of 
the newly formed, Tory-led European Conservatives and Reformers Group (ECR) in 
the European Parliament (Bale, Hanley and Szczerbiak 2010 forthcoming). KDU-
ČSL had an early and close relationship with the European People’s Party.2 
A further distinct feature of the Czech centre-right has been the continual presence of 
alongside ODS of a succession of small, short-lived market-oriented, liberal parties 
which have sought in different ways to correct the perceived narrowness of Civic 
Democrats’ vision of socio-economic transformation and proclivity to statism and 
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clientelism with policies promoting transparency, ecology, decentralization, civil 
society, the middle class. This role was successively played by the Civic Democratic 
Alliance (ODA), the Freedom Union (US), and the Green Party (SZ) and – if current 
poll ratings are borne out in forthcoming elections – the new TOP09 party. Although 
both the identities of these parties and their relationship with the Civic Democrats 
varied, all drew on similarly-sized electorates of younger, better educated, urban-
based voters and favoured by important sections of the Czech intelligentsia.  
 
The consolidation of the Czech centre-right 
The consolidation of parties and blocs of parties has been most understood in the 
literature in terms of institutionalization. In the early 1990s party system 
institutionalization in Eastern and Central Europe was extensively discussed – mainly 
in terms of party systems - as a marker of democratic consolidation (Pridham 1990; 
Randall and Svåsand 2002a), but examined only to a limited extent as a process or a 
facet of comparative party development. Two decades of successful democratic 
development in the region have, however, weakened the shibboleth of 
institutionalized parties as a sine qua non of democratization
3
 and allowed a more 
focused, individual party-oriented examination of the phenomenon over a longer time 
period.  
 
Distinguishing between party formation, stabilization and institutionalization – the 
literature suggests that, having formed as a solution to a collective action and resource 
mobilisation problem, a party becomes organizationally stable when exchanges and 
flows of resources within the party – broadly understood  as encompassing both 
material resources, members  participation and ‘public goods’ such as policies and 
influence on public policy  settle in some kind of equilibrium Panebianco 1988; 
Aldrich 1995; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Hopkin 1996, 1999; for a review Randall 
and Svåsand 2002b). Organizational stabilization may subsequently give way to a 
deeper sense of identification with the party by members, voters and supporters. 
When this occurs, the party becomes, to a lesser or greater extent, a part of their own 
identity and is seen as an end and value in itself extending beyond the instrumental 
goals of its founders. Institutionalization allows a party to manage its wider 
environment successfully and endure over time, generating an air of permanence and 
durability.  
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Viewed through the lens of the institutionalization literature the Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS) and (in particular) the Christian Democrats can be regarded as 
demonstrating key indicators of institutionalization: persistence from election to 
election, cohesive national organization, electorates which are relatively stable both in 
terms of size and in terms of the loyalty of a core electorate. ODS, the newer and 
hence potentially more weakly institutionalized party has also survived both the 
departure of its charismatic founder and leader, but also his emergence as independent 
national actor representing a rival pole of leadership  for liberal-conservative forces in 
the country. Despite the splits at elite level in 1997-8 which led to the foundation of 
the Freedom Union (US) internal conflicts have not led to fragmentation of the party 
and the party’s internal rules – both formal and informal – seem to have proved 
satisfactory mechanisms for managing recent internal divisions.  Parties of what might 
loosely be called ‘liberal centre’, by contrast, have been marked by a curiously 
contrasting instability and lack of institutionalization 
 
In their three country comparative study CEE centre-right parties, Hanley, Szczerbiak, 
Haughton and Fowler (2008) offer somewhat different measure which combines the 
notion of organizational durability (central to concepts of institutionalization) and 
measures of electoral breadth and voter concentration,  which they (somewhat 
blandly) term party ‘success’. This work concludes that the Civic Democratic Party is 
most successful Czech centre-right party as, while the Christian Democrats are stable 
and instutionalised force they – despite efforts to broaden their appeal - have been a 
niche party lacking electoral breadth. Contrasting the Czech Republic with Poland and 
Hungary, these authors conclude, that taken in toto as a bloc of parties the Czech 
centre-right is a case of intermediate success, considerably more durable and 
concentrated that the fragmented Polish right but lacking the wider appeal of the 
Hungarian Fidesz. However, we might speculate, the integration of further CEE cases 
in such an analysis would be likely to rank the Czech case towards the higher end of 
the outcome range.  
 
In the remainder of the paper, I consider explanations that have been advanced, 
implicitly or explicitly, to explain such consolidation (institutionalization, ‘success’), 
seeking both to make cross-national comparisons with East-Central and Western 
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Europe and to unpick general processes leading the stabilization of party system the 
emergence of parties as dominant political actors (Kopecký 2006, 2007) and those 
particular pertinent to parties of the right.  
 
Legacies: Civic Forum and the origins of ODS 
A first set of explanations centres on 1990-1 period which was a key formative 
moment for the Czech party system and, in particular, the emergence of the Civic 
Democratic Party from the Civic Forum movement. As several authors have noted 
ODS did not emergence simply as top-down, elite initiated project, but through the 
transformation of a broader grassroots movement (Hadjiisky 1996, 2001; Glenn 2003; 
Pšeja 2005; Hanley 2001, 2007; Gomez 2008). As the effective ‘successor party’ to 
Civic Forum, ODS inherited substantial organizational and political resources from 
the movement including a national network of local branches, managerial structures 
and the political mantle of OF main political vehicle for post-communist 
transformation.
4
 More genuinely elite parties created by right-wing Prague-based ex-
dissidents which relied on cadre party type party formation strategies the Civic 
Democratic Alliance and the Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right 
initiative of late 1990 quickly foundered.  
 
However, Civic Forum was typical of many transitional civic movements that arose in 
Eastern Europe in 1988-9 in its origins, breadth, loose horizontal structures and stress 
on direct informal participation, as well as in the political and organizational  
divisions that quickly opened up after the fall of communism (stemming from 
political diversity; weak lines of authority and ambiguous identity of such 
movements). Although centre-right parties across CEE are ‘successor parties’ to civic 
movements – and many actors seem to have seen their potential as the basis of new 
parties - few harnessed the organizational and political capital generated by anti-
communist mobilization as ODS appears to have done.   
 
In purely narrative terms, the solution can be found by relating the role of the 
charismatic Václav Klaus (Saxonberg 1999) and the group of neo-liberal economists 
associated with him to act strategically as dissatisfied elite actors able to attract the 
support of key internal constituencies in Civic Forum for Klaus’s project for 
‘partifying’ Civic Forum. The legitimacy and policy-making capacities stemming 
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from the technocratic economic background of Klaus and his collaborators, 
willingness to accommodate radical grassroots anti-communism and learn from the 
mistakes of Polish ‘technopols’ such as Leszek Balcerowicz  in 1989-90 are also 
relevant aspects of the story. However, while charismatic leadership and technocratic 
authority are clearly helpful for successful party-building, they  can be found across 
the region and offer little in the way of comparative explanation beyond that the 
‘perfect storm’ (a unique configuration of unrelated factors for the successful 
emergence of ODS from Civic Forum which come together on one occasion).  
 
A more generalizable explanation can, however, be found by revisiting legacy 
approaches. Until its final collapse in November-December Czechoslovakia’s 
hardline communist regime eschewed political liberalization of any kind or 
negotiation with opposition forces. This both impeded the formation of an 
ideologically profiled opposition proto-parties– which emerged belatedly and 
embryonically only 1988-89 – and ensured that the transition from communism when 
it finally came was driven by spontaneous mass citizen mobilization. This – coupled 
with the oppositions rapid success in toppling the regime and taking over the upper 
echelons of the state -   gave Civic Forum a unitary (albeit unintegrated) 
organizational structure, marginalizing the weak Pragocentric dissident proto-parties 
within the movement. In contrast, civic movements that emerged in more liberal 
conditions were coalitional in structure providing ready made lines of fissure. In the 
Czech case, however, there was a  low level of initial factionalisation and (in time) a 
single national organizational structure, which militated in favour of a single 
‘successor party’. 
 
The hardline nature of the outgoing communist regime also appears to have underlain 
the failure of Czech Communists to transform themselves into a post-communist 
social democratic party, delaying the formation of a credible Czech centre-left – itself 
rooted in and, more distantly, the hardline nature Czechoslovakia’s communist regime 
(Hanley 2001; Gryzmala-Busse 2002; Vachudova 2008). Such weakness may have 
enhanced the scale of right-wing parties’ electoral victory – and hence ease to access 
political office – in the 1992 elections. However, the effect of incumbency on party 
building and party institutionalization to some extent ambiguous and, other cases 
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suggest, fragmentation of the centre-left does not logically imply the strength or 
consolidation of the centre-right.
5
  
 
 
Institutions as a stabilizing factor 
 
Institutional design is widely considered to be a crucial influence on the formation of 
parties and party systems in new democracies and may be particularly relevant to the 
stabilization of centre-right parties in Central and Eastern Europe which will tend to 
be ‘new’ organizations rather than the successors to regime parties with pre-existing 
structures. The Czech Republic’s party-list PR electoral system seems to have been 
broadly favourable to party consolidation without exercising the markedly 
concentrating effects seen in more majoritarian institutions (such as Hungary’s mixed 
systems.  Specifically, the relatively low barriers to entry set by the Czech Republic’s 
party-list PR electoral system allowed small right-wing parties which had established 
themselves in 1991-2, such as the Christian Democrats and the Civic Democratic 
Alliance, to maintain an independent parliamentary existence; facilitated the entry 
into parliament of the breakaway Freedom Union party, established by a group of 
anti-Klaus politicians within the Civic Democratic Party and – even following 
changes to the electoral law in 2002 which disadvantaged small parties by reducing 
mean district magnitude - provided sufficient incentives to make the foundation of 
TOP09 a viable project for its founders in existing parties.  
 
 
A more compelling institutional argument concerning the relative cohesiveness of the 
Czech centre-right can be made for its parliamentary rather a presidential or semi-
presidential system. In a paired comparison of the Czech Republic and Poland, 
Saxonberg (2003) has argued that the presence of a well-institutionalised party on the 
Czech centre-right derives, in part, from an indirectly elected presidency and 
concomitant absence of incentives for charismatic leaders to pursue alternatives to 
party formation. He further contends that, by contrast, Poland’s relatively fragmented 
centre-right is the result of the incentives facing that country’s head of state. 
Specifically, he suggests that the relatively powerful, directly elected presidency in 
Poland led a charismatic leader like Lech Wałęsa to avoid founding or consistently 
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supporting a party. To counter the argument that these institutional effects should, 
hypothetically, also operate on the Polish centre-left but do not appear to do so, 
Saxonberg argues that, unlike communist successor parties, centre-right parties are 
typically ‘new’ formations, which will experience early problems of stabilisation and 
institutionalisation making them particularly susceptible to these effects. 
 
At aggregate level, there is evidence co-relating weak party structures in new 
democracies with moderate and strong presidentialism (Shugart 1998). However, at 
case study level – and specifically in the Czech case – it is difficult to assess whether 
 a strong parliamentary regime should be regarded as much (if not more) an effect of 
strong political parties as a cause and it is difficult to separate these two processes out 
analytically. The Constitution of the Czech Republic was agreed by the major 
political parties in December 1992 and therefore, we might argue, the current weak 
Czech presidency is clearly the product of strong parties, not vice versa.
6
 Moreover, in 
the Czech case the centre-left, which was not based on a reformed communist party 
but a much more diverse set of forcing centring on the Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD) arguably benefitted more from institutional incentives for party consolidation.  
 
Moreover, while Saxonberg is undoubtedly correct to argue that, in strong 
Czech(oslovak) parliamentarism and a weak presidency elected by parliament made 
party-building the only realistic route to executive power for ambitious politicians, 
post-communist elites do not always appear to behave in these rational, office-seeking 
terms. If responding ‘rationally’ to institutional incentives, Václav Havel should have 
become engaged in party politics. However, upon becoming a presidential candidate 
in December 1989, Havel’s distaste for formal political organisation and, in particular, 
party political organisation, led him to break all contact with the Civic Forum 
movement he had co-founded and to refuse fully to re-engage with it even in 
September-October when he accepted that its transformation into a more conventional 
party-like grouping was necessary and unavoidable. Havel’s ‘irrational’ behaviour 
thus opened the way for the ‘more rational’ Klaus to win power through a party-
building strategy. This suggests that the cognitive frameworks through which new 
political elites approach post-transition politics is at least as important in 
understanding party building.
7
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Timing: Critical decisions and the locking of in early advantages 
Peter Mair’s (1997: 1-16) exploration of Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) argument about 
the ‘freezing’ of the West European party systems in early 20th century identifies a 
range of mechanisms producing ‘increasing returns’ for political parties, which first 
achieve a degree of success These include the monopolisation of pre-existing, human 
and material resources by established parties, leaving potential new entrants resource-
starved and unable to meet high start-up costs; organisational strategies which 
encapsulate key constituencies and/or offer them selective group benefits; and 
discourse strategies shaping understandings of political competition. At the societal 
level, additional ‘lock-in’ mechanisms include the development of partisan 
identification among voters and members, and rational ‘adaptive expectations’ on the 
part of others for whom forming or supporting a new party with little prospect of 
immediate success represent wasted effort. In this perspective – bar exogenous shocks 
or powerful external pressures -  institutionalization can be seen as self-perpetuating 
and self-reinforcing: in other words institutionalization processes also act as a 
mechanism to ‘lock-in’ parties’ relative strength with regard to competitors, helping 
patterns of party competition settle into a changing but predictable equilibrium.  
 
As many analysts have noted (Kopecký 1995; Hanley 2001; van Biezen 2003) 
compared to classic cases of West European party and party system formation, such 
mechanisms were weak and often absent. Mass organisation and encapsulation 
strategies, with a few well-defined ‘subcultural’ exceptions, costly and ineffective; 
social constituencies in the region are often ill defined; and partisan identification was 
weak and slow to develop in societies with limited civic engagement where levels of 
cynicism about parties, politicians and politics are high. The growing role of state 
funding as the main source of party resources, while a useful substitute – and to some 
extent a ‘lock in’ mechanism -  sustained a party only so long as it enjoyed (and 
usually in proportion to its) electoral success, as well as offers immediate resources to 
political newcomers. However, such mechanisms such as organizational 
encapsulation were clearly unavailable to party builders in Central and Eastern 
Europe, other advantages of early formation do seem to have accrued to the Civic 
Democrats. The party also seems to have benefitted from the development of a degree 
of voter identification unusual for larger, ‘non-historic’ parties.   
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Such path dependence perspectives which stress the importance of timing and the 
‘locking in’ of advantages built up in formative periods8 also allow the incorporation 
of political agency, strategy and choice in more theoretically convincing terms. 
Recent accounts of post-communist party development – and party development in 
new democracies in Europe more generally (Kreuzer 2009) -  have often identified the 
key causal moments as path-setting ‘critical junctures’ when leaders and their 
unconstrained choices and strategies have important – and often unintended - 
consequences for longer term political development. In post-communist Central and 
Eastern Europe such junctures are typically seen as occurring in and just after the 
period of transition in 1989-90. In her work on communist successor parties, 
Gryzmala-Busse (2002) for example, argues that organisational and ideological 
choices made by reform-minded elites in communist successor parties in 1989-91 
played a decisive role in determining their future developmental path.
9
 A similar 
framework of path dependency and post-transition critical junctures has been 
constructed by Hanley, Szczerbiak, Haughton and Fowler (2008) to explain diversity 
and varying levels of success on the CEE centre-right, turning in the Czech cases on 
strategic choices made by leading politicians in the struggle to control and transform 
Civic Forum in 1990-1. 
 
However, there are reasons to regard explanatory frameworks based on path 
dependency and critical junctures with some caution even in a case such as ODS, 
where the party’s endurance and the presence of some classic ‘lock-in’ mechanism 
such as the growth of a more loyal core electorate. Compared to some other types 
institutions studied in terms of path dependent such as pension systems,  political 
parties and party systems are very weakly locked in. This is especially  the case in 
Central and Eastern Europe where the key elements ‘locking in’ or ‘freezing’ West 
European party systems – voter loyalty and resource monopolization – are weakened 
by greater electoral volatility, the availability of state funding and the decline in the 
importance of party organization for electoral mobilization.  
 
Although it would be unwise dramatic breakdown or collapse of well established and 
seemingly stable such party such as ODS – erroneous predictions of whose imminent 
fragmentation have been made on several occasions
10
 - this analysis suggests that the 
party’s stability may be quite a brittle phenomenon.  In analytical terms, it therefore 
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seems necessary to consider explanatory variables other than those which, implicitly 
or explicitly, invoke a path dependent logic centring on events at a critical moment in 
the past ‘locking in’ stability over the longer term. 
 
Internal dynamics: stratarchy, ODS and the Czech right 
 
Contrasting patterns of party organization, as well  as patterns of party formation, 
have long been recognised as central to party stabilization and institutionalization. 
However, much work on party organization in Central and Eastern has reflected a 
‘model fitting’ logic, which seeks to relate parties in the region to typologies and 
models developed in the West European contexts. Such ‘model fitting’ - or East-West 
comparison -  has generated many useful insights. However, it has arguably distract 
from a consideration of the internal dynamics of parties in the region and as well as 
leading to an overemphasis on static, formal aspects of party organization.  
 
Such work has often been most interesting when it highlights anomalies between 
models and empirical realities. Thus, in the case of the Czech centre-right, while it 
lacks the mass organization inherited by a former satellite party with historic roots in 
the pre-communist period such as the Christian Democrats, with local associations in 
some three quarters of Czech communes with 2000 or more inhabitants (Kyloušek 
2005), the Civic Democrats’ were far from fitting the stereotype of ‘new’ parties in 
CEE as elite-dominated, state-centric low membership organizations equivalent 
‘electoral professional party’ Panebianco (1988) saw has gradually displaced residual 
forms of mass party organization  in Western Europe. Similarly, while elites were 
clearly powerful, the power relationships between the different ‘faces’ of the Civic 
Democrats were more complex than the straightforward dominance of the party in 
public office.
11
   
 
The evident complexity relationship between ODS’s elite ‘faces’ and the grassroots 
‘party on the ground’ raises questions about the image of a centralized, hierarchical 
dominated by national leaders through control of public funding and state resources 
party (van Biezen 2003: 147), whose local organization was essentially redundant 
legacy of its origins in Civic Forum. Viewed in terms of formal organization, ODS 
did indeed appear as a four-tier hierarchy of local, district, regional and national 
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bodies based linked clear lines of democratic and bureaucratic accountability. 
However, as Kopecký (1995: 526) first intimated, in many ways the internal dynamics 
of ODS have less those of the hierarchically integrated ‘standard party’ than those of a 
looser, stratarchical alliance of local and national elites.  
 
In stratarchical power relationships -  found historically in many US and Canadian 
parties -  different party ‘faces’ enjoy considerable autonomy, whilst remaining 
interdependent by establishing a rough division of labour and thus organizational 
stability (Carty and Cross 2006). Carty (2004) suggests that stratarchical patterns can 
be summed in ideal type as a ‘franchise model’ of party organization whereby 
 
‘…. a central organization recognizable by its common brand, determines the 
product line and sets standards for its production and labelling, manages 
marketing and advertising strategy and provides management and training as 
well as arranging for the supplies needed by local outlets. … individual 
franchises exist to deliver the product to a particular market. To do so they 
invest local resources, both capital and personnel….’  
(Carty 2004: 10) 
 
Many aspects of ODS’s formation and functioning had the characteristics of the 
stratarchical ‘franchise model’. In 1991-2, ODS local organisations were formally 
founded through the granting of ‘licenses’ by the national leadership to local groups 
of pre-registered Klaus supporters.  These ‘licenses’ could be (and sometimes were) 
revoked for breaches of national party guidelines, which contradicted or undermined 
its  national strategy and identity (‘brand’), such as, for example, local co-operation 
with the Communist Party. In most respects, however, both formally and de facto 
local and district associations enjoyed very considerable autonomy in their day-to-day 
functioning. Despite numerous revisions in the course of 1990s, ODS statutes never 
stipulated any specific activities that members needed to undertake to meet the 
responsibilities of membership
12
 and were generally far less prescriptive than the 
(nevertheless low) requirements of other major Czech parties (Linek 2004: 183, 184). 
From 1993 local ODS associations acquired the right to approve new membership 
applications and the exclusive right to expel members;  enjoyed full autonomy in 
selecting candidates for communal and municipal elections and broad latitude to 
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conclude local level coalitions with any parties other than the Communists or the far 
right. Local and district organization were required to be financially autonomous, 
raising funds to meet their own running costs, and – despite occasional ad hoc 
provision off-the-books cash payments to fight elections - neither made nor received 
significant regular transfers from party headquarters. Local autonomy was further 
reinforced by ODS elites’ neglect of their party machine after the party won national 
office in 1992.  
 
Such extensive autonomy meant that grassroots political influence in ODS was 
uneven and limited in scope.  As the party’s Executive Deputy Chairman Libor Novák 
reported in 1996 most ODS members did no more than pay party dues and that most 
local party work was carried out by a handful of activists, holding multiple office. As 
national ODS officials have some noted with frustration, grassroots members, who 
were politically active were largely absorbed in parish pump politics and ignorant of 
or uninterested in national politics. Many used the party’s local branches as little more 
than vehicles to advance personal or local interests (Hanley 2007: 101-105). 
 
Arguably, such localism was central to the ‘franchise contract’ through which ODS 
stabilized itself. The active independence of franchisee and franchisor described by 
Carty (2004) was evident in local (and later regional and Senate elections) when the 
ODS national machine  and parliamentary elites provided a national advertising 
campaign – sometimes with a considerable budget    the support of nationally known 
politicians and an outline programme offering local organizations and candidates 
legitimacy and a clear political identity in exchange for their investment of local 
resources to deliver the ODS ‘product’ on the ground.  
 
In other respects, the ODS franchising relationship was one of passive 
interdependence based on respect for mutual autonomy. Local, and above all district, 
ODS organizations were free to pursue their own local strategies provided that they 
did not contradict the ODS ‘brand’ or destabilize the party’s organization structures. 
In exchange, the formulation of national strategy and policy was left to Prague-based 
parliamentary and political elites, who crafted programmes which allowed scope for 
the local-level pursuit of business and other interests, thereby sustaining ODS 
organization on the ground. 
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Since the introduction in 2000-2 of elected regional authorities whose boundaries 
correspond to the 14 electoral districts used for parliamentary elections - and the 
consequent abolition (for most purposes) of administrative districts -  most political 
parties including the Civic Democrats, have adjusted their internal structures to create 
(or reinforce) regional organizations. This has naturally impacted upon internal 
dynamics and internal power relationships in Czech parties, appearing in the case of 
ODS to have empowered regional leaders at the expense of both national 
parliamentary elites and more localized power groupings, weakening – and perhaps 
over  the longer term disintegrating – the stratarchical elite-grassroots bargain 
underpinning a successful franchise party.  However, as stratarchically organized 
parties can thrive even in fully federalized political systems such as that of Canada 
(Clarkson 2005), it seems likely that stratarchical relationships in a party like ODS 
might be modified, rather than nullified. In this connection it is interesting that the 
newest arrival on the Czech political scene, the TOP09, seems to have adopted an 
essentially stratarchical ‘franchise model’ of party formation: a central preparatory 
committee provides a national identity and ‘brand’ (embodied by its leader Karel 
Schwazenberg) while the grassroots movement of independent mayors and Senators 
provides a series of local franchisees.  
 
This may also imply a re-orientation of research on ODS away from its role as a 
national actor (in cross-national comparison) in favour of a region and/or local 
perspective, which will allow the role of local elite networks – anecdotally of 
considerable importance for both ODS and other Czech parties (Pečinka 2005) – to be 
explored in a more rigourous way, as well as allowing a more holistic perspective 
taking the overlapping relationships parties, institutions, officials, economic interests 
and civil society (see, for example, Horak 2007). 
 
Elite cohesion 
As a purported alternative to institutional, resource mobilization and path dependent 
explanations Hanley, Szczerbiak, Haughton and Fowler (2008) advance the notion of 
elite cohesion and positioning as the key to understanding the development broad and 
stable centre-right parties and blocs.
13
 The ability of an elite group over time to reach 
and maintain consensus over key strategic and policy issues is underpinned by 
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networks of communication based on both formal membership of parties, 
governments or bureaucracies and informal ties forged through common life 
experiences, friendship and professional networks and shared cultural values. The 
more cohesive the elite founding a party, they suggest, the more quickly, successful 
and broadly it will consolidate.  
 
The Czech Civic Democrats, they argue, were founded by precisely a cohesive, 
socially and generationally defined elite, which emerged during late communism: a 
group of economists, included  Václav Klaus as well as a number of other 
subsequently prominent political figures, which emerged during 1970s and 1980s as 
part of a so-called ‘grey zone’ of critically minded technocrats holding posts in 
official research and financial institutions who were radically opposed to the regime 
status quo  but felt little need for independent organizations such as Charter 77. From 
the late 1960s this group evolved a common set of ideas and orientations, coming to 
not reject reform communist notions of ‘socialist market’ but also the Keynesian ‘neo-
classical synthesis’ in favour of neo-liberalism of the Austrian and Chicago schools, 
developing a distinct culture at odds with the Bohemianism and informal political of 
some dissident. As one Charter 77 signatory wryly observed in early 1990 '[a]ll the 
other people in Civic Forum wear sweaters and call each other ty but these gentlemen 
wear ties and say vy”. Figures from this distinct elite group not only acted as an 
intellectual reservoir and conduit for ideas and policies that would define the Czech 
right, but also became the dominant elite group around which the Civic Democratic 
Party coalesced in 1990-1. Between 1992 and 1997, in addition to Klaus’s role as 
party leader and prime minister, neo-liberal economists from the former ‘grey zone’ 
held two of the four Civic Democrat vice-chairmanships and four of the party’s 
eleven cabinet posts. 
 
Moreover, they argue this elite group benefited from their positioning as credible 
second-rank challenger elites to figures who had assumed positions of power after 
1989 in government or parliament they had gained as part of the ‘democratic camp’ 
that had displaced communism. They were sufficiently peripheral that during fluid 
periods of realignment that inevitably followed they were able to project themselves 
as political outsiders more closely linked to the provinces and the grassroots, than 
metropolitan elites and capable of bringing new policies and a new professionalism to 
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transition politics.
14
  Such perspectives again move away from the focus on static, 
formal organization forms, but leave unanswered questions about elite cohesion is 
maintained, how inter-elite (or  intra-elite conflict) is managed or tends to overlook 
the fact that elite groups with different sociological and historical backgrounds 
collaborate and co-operate within a single organization. For example, many leadership 
posts in the Civic Democrat leadership of the period were held by politicians with a 
background in the district organizations of the Civic Forum movement (Balík 2006: 
301-2). As Klaus and the ‘grey zone’ economists vacated the party leadership in the 
period 1997-2002, such perspectives may have limited ability to explain continued 
stability. Such limitations are confirmed by the case of the Civic Democratic Alliance 
(ODA) whose cohesive founding elite of conservative dissidents proved unable to 
accommodate the growing preponderance of those without this background, leading to 
divisive splits in the party (Pšeja 2005, Hanley 2007) 
 
Ideology and party cohesion 
Hanley, Szczerbiak, Haughton and Fowler (2008) also claim that the subsequent 
ability of elites founding centre-right parties  to (re-)fashion broad integrative 
ideological narratives that relate current processes of post-communist transformation 
to earlier conservative, nationalist and anti-communist traditions, unite broad swathes 
of activists and voters,  is a key fact in their cohesion and endurance as organizations 
and electoral blocs. An integrative ideological narrative is, they, important in terms of 
both providing cohesion during the early stages of party formation and shaping the 
new political identities that are necessary to provide a meaningful framework for 
political action in periods of far-reaching social and political change, such as post-
communist transformation. In post-communist democracies, particularly during the 
early post-transition period when structural determinants may be weaker, levels of 
uncertainty higher and political identities – and especially of the long repressed 
political right - less well-defined, the weaknesses of civil society and well-understood 
social interests also give ideological construction a crucial role in orienting action. 
In this perspective a key element of the Civic Democratic Party’s political success – 
and that of the broader ‘civic right’ - lie in its leaders’ ability to frame a compelling 
new ideological discourse of ‘rightness’ which imported New Anglo-American Right 
ideas, grounded them in a Czech post-communist context and related them to the 
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delivery of a programme of post-communist social and economic transformation. This 
discourse, they suggest, was an innovative synthesis of Hayekian neo-liberalism and 
aspects of Czech nationalism, which successfully linked historically rooted ideas 
about Czech national identity with the tasks of post-communist transformation and 
delegitimized centrists and centre-left opponents. Similar successful projects of right-
wing ideology construction, they suggest, can be found in Hungary, but not in Poland. 
This draws on a strain of political economy influenced literature concerned with 
understanding the social support for neo-liberal policies in the absence of distinct 
class or interest group structures (Appel 2004), as well as Hanley’s (1999) reading 
and re-application of the British debates of 1980s about ‘Thatcherism’ to the Czech 
context. However, whilst not implausible, such explanations are difficult to measure 
and test and, as  Some party specialists have argued that concepts such a ‘logic of 
ideas’ or ‘structures of discourse’ are so vague and difficult to operationalise that they 
should, at most, be used for residual explanation only when more easily testable 
hypotheses are exhausted (Kitschelt 1994: 278).  
 
Electoral strategy and party stability: the ‘broadening out’ debate 
Strategic debates on the Czech centre-right from early mid-1990s have centred on 
single dilemma: that of widening electoral appeal and seeking to incorporate a diverse 
range of groups and views versus maintaining ideological, political cohesion and 
organizational cohesion hence reducing risks of political instability. Such breadth 
versus cohesion debates have been a constantly recurring theme in the development of 
the Czech centre-right since 1989: from ODS’s tortured negotiations in 1991-2 
attempting – and largely failing -   to incorporate small dissident-led right-wing 
groups and conservative-minded dissidents in the debate; the debate launched in 1996 
by ODS Vice Chairman Josef Zeleniec about  ‘broadening out’ (rozkročení) both 
towards the political centre and conservative anti-communist voters on the right, 
Zieleniec to win some 40 per cent of the Czech electorate and Václav Klaus’s 
rejection of ideas as diluting the party into typical Central European ‘People’s Party’ 
formation; the rival positions of the current ODS leader Miroslav Topolánek and 
challenger for the leadership at the party’s most recent congress, Pavel Bém, and 
related debates ODS’s intellectual periphery as to whether the party should seek to 
integrate the voters and values of small allied parties such as the Greens or the 
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Christian Democrats (or both) (Morava 2007). The issue has also been raised in more 
organizational terms following Miroslav Topolánek’s vaguely worded appeal to other 
right-wing groups to support or work with ODS, prompting speculation that the Civic 
Democrats’ might become the core Italian-style coalitional party perhaps organized 
along the line of Berlusconi’s Pole of Freedom, perhaps incorporating the new TOP09 
grouping of ex-Christian Democrats and independents.
15
  
 
Such dilemmas are common to many, if not, most political parties in many party 
systems and involve trade-offs not only between the priorities of different factions and 
internal actors but also a trade-off by the party as whole between policy or ideology 
goals and the need to win parliamentary majorities and political office (see Kitschelt 
1994; Müller and Strom 1999). However, it is a dilemma that is particularly pertinent 
for the Czech right, given the finally balanced and often deadlocked character of 
Czech elections; the weakness of the Civic Democrats’ potential coalition parties; and 
what polling suggests is the party’s more limited potential maximum vote that than of 
the Social Democrats (CVVM 2006). 
16
 In socio-electoral terms, despite having a 
loyal core vote based in a broad constituency of pro-market transition ‘winners’, the 
Civic Democrats’ underlying appeal - even in 2006 at the moment of their greatest 
electoral triumph – lags behind that of the centre-left. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has reflected upon the consolidation of centre-right parties of in the Czech 
Republic in the two decades since the fall of communism.  It has noted that, in 
addition to the distinctness of the predominance of market liberal orientations, Czech 
centre-right parties are also characterized by an unusual pattern of stabilization: a 
rapidly consolidated broad centre-right party (ODS) and highly unstable ‘liberal 
centre’ characterized by a succession of small, relatively short-lived groupings 
offering alternative brands of market-oriented liberalism. This pattern contrasts both 
with the stabilization patterns of the Czech left and those of centre-right groupings 
elsewhere in CEE. In many cases, this has taken the form of initial fragmentation 
followed by a period of reconstruction though merger and coalition-building around a 
smaller core grouping. Such a pattern can, for example, be detected in the 
consolidation in late 1990s of the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD) or Hungary’s main 
centre-right grouping, Fidesz.  
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A parallel formation process has been the transformation (to varying extents) of 
existing ‘historic’ parties with inherited mass organizations, including former ruling 
communist parties and their satellites. Such a process characterised the emergence of 
the contemporary Czech KSČM and other communist successor parties, but also the 
Czech Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and historic 
parties reconstituted after the fall of communism such as the Hungarian Christian 
Democrats (KNDP) or Romanian Liberals (PNL). For parties outside the post-
communist left, however, this process has generally been a recipie for the creation 
well established niche parties rather than major formations. 
 
Neither the comparative literature on CEE party development, nor more monographic 
work on the Czech party politics has systematically addressed the issue of the 
stabilisation and consolidation of the Czech centre-right. Nevertheless, a number of 
theoretically grounded, if partly contradictory, explanations can be derived from these 
literatures: legacies of the communist and pre-communist period; transition legacies 
stemming from the break-up of Civic Forum; institutional incentives of electoral and 
party law; the role of party internal party dynamics organization; successes and 
failures of ideological; or the cohesiveness of  elites. Of these, the most close fitting 
explanation of the Czech centre-right’s distinct pattern of consolidation is arguably to 
be found in transitional legacies, specifically in the character of the Civic Forum 
movement and the formation into the Civic Democratic Party from its ‘right-wing’ in 
1990-1. In hindsight the boundaries set by the founders of ODS in defining the new 
party seem a critical juncture’ explaining both the subsequent character of ODS 
(including its stability) and the inchoate ‘liberal centre’ (including its instability).  
 
The instability and collapse of small, organizationally weak centre parties in itself a 
relatively straightforward one. However, appeal to such notions of path dependence to 
explain the stability of ODS must adequately specify mechanisms generating and 
reproducing (‘locking in’) such stability. So far, efforts to address such issues ( for 
example Hanley, Szczerbiak, Haughton and Fowler 2008) have stronger on critique 
than positive explanation. Similar criticism relating to under-specification of long-
term causal mechanisms (supposedly operating over two decades) can be levelled at 
efforts to formulate alternative explanations of consolidation such as ideological 
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construction or elite cohesion. This implies that, whatever theoretical perspectives are 
adopted, future research on question of stabilization and consolidation on the Czech 
centre-right will have to prioritise such issues of process and mechanism. 
 
However, the elusiveness of such stabilization mechanisms in the literature might 
equally suggest that they are empirically weak or absent. A final possibility, therefore, 
is that the stabilization and consolidation pattern of the Czech centre-right are the 
product of an accumulation or coming together of some or all of the different factors 
identifiable in the literature. Such ‘configurational’ accounts of causation are 
increasingly influential in comparative politics (Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Such a 
‘configurational’ understanding of patterns of stability and instability on Czech 
centre-right might lead us to view them as a brittle and changeable outcome capable 
of being eroded, or even suddenly undermined, by internal changes or shifts in 
external opportunity structures. This implies that future research on parties of the 
Czech centre-right must be equally alert to the workings potential mechanisms of 
‘deconsolidation’17 such as the longer consequences of change in centre-periphery 
power relations brought about by regionalization, or shifts in long-term strategic 
debate on the Czech centre right about the trade-off between political breadth and 
political coherence.  
 
The distinctness of the Czech centre-right and its patterns of consolidation therefore 
seem to offer rich and underexploited opportunities for research foregrounding 
national context while retaining a strongly comparative perspective of the kind 
advocated by Lees (2007) drawing on – and developing – comparative strategies such 
as the amended critical case study approach outlined by Gerring (2007) or the 
systematic use of the sub-national comparative method (Snyder 2001). 
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Notes 
 
1
 This paper was presented at the 20 Years of Czech Democracy conference, Masaryk 
University, Brno 14 September 2009. The author would like to thank participants -  
especially Kevin Deegan-Krause and Petr Kopecký - for stimulating conversations 
that informed revisions to this paper. 
 
2
  KDU-ČSL had observer status in the EPP from 1996, becoming an associate 
member in 1998 and a full member in 2004 following Czech EU accession.  
 
3
 This reflects both the shifting agenda of democracy research in the region from one 
of system stability to issues of democratic quality (Roberts 2006) and the several 
examples in the region of successfully consolidated democracies with persistently 
fragmented, weakly institutionalized parties and party systems (the Baltic states (Sikk 
2006) and, to a lesser extent, Poland (Markowski  2001). 
 
4
 Civic Forum’s ‘farewell Assembly’ of 23 February 1991 agreed that Civic Forum’s 
assets at national level  would be split evenly between Klaus’s Civic Democratic 
Party and the liberal-centrist Civic Movement  but would, partly on Klaus’s 
insistence, exclude other political groups within the Forum. Local and district Civic 
Fora were to agree their own arrangements for the division of their property. Given 
Klaus’s considerable grassroots support, the majority agreed that most or all of their 
assets should be passed to ODS.   In almost every district a majority of  Civic Forum’s 
full-time professional ‘managers’ (officials) - nationally approximately three quarters 
of the total -  joined ODS (Hadjiisky 1996; Hanley 2007 8; see also Pšeja 2005).  
 
5
  As the Polish experience of the 1990s demonstrated even in the presence of 
weakened centre-left parties, the centre-right can fragment (Szczerbiak 2004; Ost 
2005). 
 
6
 Even under the Czechoslovak constitution of 1990-2, which accorded the presidency 
stronger powers, parties were able to check Havel. For example, they easily blocked a 
package of emergency constitutional and political laws that Havel proposed in late 
1991 to resolve the crisis of Czecho-Slovak federalism. 
 
7
 Semi-presidentialism should perhaps be viewed as offering a complex mix of 
incentives and can in certain circumstances favour the formation of broad parties or 
party blocs, albeit perhaps more often ‘rally’ (rassemblment) type parties familiar 
from the French context (Graham 1993) 
 
8
 Indeed, Lipset and Rokkan’s classic 1967 article on party systems is often cited as 
pioneering path dependence perspectives (see Pierson 2004) 
9
  See: Anna Grzymała-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of 
Communist Parties in East-Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002. 
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10
 This is also the case for the Czech Social Democrats  (ČSSD) whose electoral 
support has oscillated more markedly than that of ODS and which appears more 
factionalized.  
 
11
 As van Biezen (2003: 147, 150-2) points out, although the ODS parliamentary 
group had a well defined autonomy with the party; ODS parliamentarians and 
ministers overlapped with the national leadership; and elected representatives enjoyed 
ex-offico rights to attend party congresses and district and regional assemblies as 
delegates. However, the bulk of the public subsidies on which ODS, like other Czech 
parties, relied were channelled to the party’s national organization not to its 
parliamentary group. In practice, and despite overlapping membership, the 
relationship between the ‘party in central office’ (the ODS Executive Council and 
gremium) and its ministers and parliamentarians seems to have been confused one, 
which tended to empower the party leader. 
 
12
  The 1994 Law on Political Parties requires party statutes to definite members’ 
rights and responsibilities. 
13
 It is unclear from their work if their analysis is intended to be generalizable to other 
party types or whether the greater newness and collective action problems of centre-
right parties makes this perspective especially relevant to them.  
 
14
 In the other successful case of right-wing party development they review, that of 
Hungary, Viktor Orbán and his associates came from provincial backgrounds, but 
were educated at elite Budapest univesities 
. 
15
 A related but more subsidiary debate which touches upon both the stability and 
identity of the Czech centre-right concerns whether it should try to compete with the 
centre-left and/or work for centre-right majority government, rather than co-operating 
with the left and centre in coalition governments spanning the left-right divide 
(conceivably including Grand Coalition).  However, there a few on the Czech centre-
right who would advocate this as more than a tactical, temporary tactic.  
 
16
 CVVM found that 85 per cent of ODS voters in 2006 also supported the party in 
2002 – but estimated ODS’s maximum potential vote at 37 per cent, while that for the 
Social Democrat electorate was 40 per cent. It also found that higher turnout benefited 
the Social Democrats. See also reports of the CVVM press conference. Hospodářské 
noviny 24 July 2006,  Lidové noviny 24 July 2006. 
 
17
 I borrow this term from Geoffrey Pridham (2009) while disagreeing with his 
broader arguments that the Czech Republic is not a consolidated democracy and that 
the ‘democratic consolidation’ perspective therefore remains relevant to the study of 
contemporary Czech politics.   
